|196| 환경법과 정책 제13권(2014.9.30) . Introduction Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 2) The Chevron doctrine seeks to keep federal courts from second-guessing agency expertise, 3) instructing courts to uphold an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision if the agency's explanation is reasonable. 4) Beginning in the early 1970's, the federal courts began to take a "hard look" when reviewing administrative agency actions. 5) In the early 1980's, the Supreme Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) . 3) Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866: "Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences." 4) Id. at 843. 5) See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) ; see also Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509, 511-12 (1974) .
Despite such judicial deference, the Bush Administration was surprisingly ineffective in its attempts to overturn many rules in environmental and natural resources law. 11) There are many possibilities as to why these attempts were unsuccessful, including that the federal courts may be becoming increasingly skeptical of such changes, requiring more explanation, or that the speed at which the administration sought to rescind previous rules led to an inability to sufficiently explain the change, or that the Bush Administration was simply inept at explaining 463 U.S. 29 (1983) . 8) Id. 9) State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57: "'An agency's view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or without a change in circumstances. But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis ' Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1970 ), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1971 . We do not accept all of the reasoning of the Court of Appeals but we do conclude that the agency has failed to supply the requisite 'reasoned analysis' in this case." 10) Id. at 42: "Accordingly, an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance." 11) See Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (D. Id. 2008 Id. 2008) (granting an injunction against the implementation of BLM revisions to nationwide grazing regulations under NEPA, FLPMA, and the ESA).
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snowmobiles, 17) and the Roadless Rule. 18) Part IV analyzes these cases to determine why the Bush Administration had a difficult time defending such policy changes. This article concludes that the Bush Administration's inability to consistently defend why its new environmental and natural resources policies should replace an earlier administration's policies is because the agencies were unable or unwilling to adequately explain why the change was necessary in light of the prior administration's analysis of the problem.
Ⅱ. Transitions from One President to the Next and the State Farm Rule
Since President Franklin Roosevelt, there have been twelve presidential transitions, with eight being inter-political party changes. 19 제13권(2014.9.30) Typically, agencies promulgate rules using the informal, notice-and-comment process. 37) In notice-and-comment rulemaking, the agency publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register. 38) The agency then allows the interested public to comment and the agency considers those comments. 39) Lastly, the agency publishes the final rule. 40) In contrast to "midnight regulations" which can be undone using the CRA, or delayed pending review through executive orders, the revocation of an existing rule requires a subsequent rulemaking. 41 William Funk, 27 Admin. & Reg. L. News 8-9 (Summer 2002) |204| 환경법과 정책 제13권(2014.9.30) Congress. 56) Chevron reviews agency actions as a matter of statutory interpretatio n. 57) By contrast, State Farm reviews a regulation on the basis of the rulemaking records "for its reasonableness in the sense of whether it will actually achieve its stated purpose." 58) As a result, although federal courts give administrative agencies substantial deference when promulgating a rule interpreting an ambiguous statute that the agency carries out, the rescission of a rule under State Farm requires federal courts to evaluate an agency's action in light of the agencies' previous analyses and conclusions. 2) conduct surveys prior to ground-disturbing activities; 3) conduct extensive surveys to find high priority sites for hard-to-find species; and 4) conduct general regional surveys to gain information about poorly known species. Coggins, supra note 62, at 753-54: "The Northwest Forest Plan, the most ambitious exercise in ecosystem management yet undertaken and perhaps the most prominent controversy ever to emerge under the ESA, was born in efforts to protect the northern spotted owl .The Forest Service has traditionally produced about half of the total timber harvest in the National Forest System from the forests of 정책 제13권(2014.9.30) and manage" standards. 143) The court stated that this "new information" did not address whether conditions had changed in order to show that "survey and manage" standards were no longer needed. 144) The agencies also argued that they have discretion to change policy to carry out the goals of the Northwest Forest Plan. 145) The court concluded that "[w]hile true, this misses the point" because the agencies' NEPA analysis was inconsistent with its prior analysis that "survey and manage" standards were adopted, in part, to address the degraded condition of the forest reserves. 146) Instead, NEPA required the Forest Service and BLM to explain why the agencies previously thought that the "survey and manage" standards were necessary but now assumed the standard was no longer necessary. Judge Sullivan began his discussion by noting that the agency decision to allow increased snowmobile amounted to a "180 degree reversal" from the previous administration because the Clinton Snowcoach Rule explicitly cited the negative environmental effects that snowmobiles had on the parks. 163) Such a "dramatic change in course" triggered the responsibility for the NPS to supply a "reasoned analysis" for the change. 164) Judge Sullivan noted that although the Clinton Rule was not longstanding, the rulemaking was "lengthy, complex, and complete," and involved almost a decade of study. 165 |220| 환경법과 정책 제13권(2014.9.30) require group tours and instead still allowed solo travel. 173) Judge Sullivan noted that there was a large gap between the Clinton Administration rule and the Bush Administration rule because the Clinton rule reasoned that snowmobile use "adversely impacted" wildlife and park resources to such a degree that snowmobiles should be banned while the Bush rule allowed "nearly one thousand snowmobiles" each day. 174) The court focused on the Organic Act's 175) "clear conservation mandate" and the "previous conclusion that snowmobile use amounted to unlawful impairment" to come to the conclusion that the agency had not adequately explained the rule change. 176) As a result, the court remanded the rule. 177) The Bush Administration made several ensuing attempts to allow increased snowmobile use in Yellowstone. 178) In the fall of 2008, Judge Sullivan held that the NPS winter-use plan allowing 540 snowmobiles per day was arbitrary and capricious and violated the NPS Organic Act because the Park Service could not explain in the rule why the "major adverse impacts" caused by increased 173) Id.: "Further, the requirements that snowmobilers travel in groups, under the theory that this will lessen interaction with wildlife, is essentially eliminated in the 2003 Final Rule, as the 'group' size is defined as '1-11 snowmobiles.' 68 Fed. Reg. at 69,275. Thus, the Rule continues to allow for snowmobilers to travel alone, thereby eliminating the benefit of 'group' travel. Finally, the Final Rule acknowledges the inherent flaws in a tour-guide system, nothing that, even between passengers on the same machine, it is "very difficult if not impossible to communicate with the driver over the noise of a snowmobile. 68 Fed. Reg. at 69,275." 174) Id. at 107-108: "In 2001, the rulemaking process culminated in a finding that snowmobiling so adversely impacted the wildlife and resources of the Parks that all snowmobile use must be halted. A scant three years later, the rulemaking process culminated in the conclusion that nearly one thousand snowmobiles will be allowed to enter the park each day." 175) 16 U.S.C. §1 (2000) is for the Executive Branch. Nor is there any doubt that the Forest Service has the authority to change policies from a uniform national approach strongly protecting roadless areas from human encroachment to a more localized approach permitting more roads and logging, provided that it follows the proper procedures. Rather, the question is whether the Forest Service complied with the procedures mandated by Congress for consideration of potential environment impact prior to changing course, or was exempt from doing so." 199) Id. at 894. exclusion arguing that the rule was "merely procedural in nature" and had "no direct, indirect, or cumulative effect on the environment. injunction to argue that the State Petitions Rule did not repeal the Roadless Rule but only replaced it on paper, Defendants ignore the legal effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision to vacate the judgment of the district court." 204) Id. at 898: "And because the Forest Service has rejected two states' requests to expedite the petitioning process in an effort to regain the Roadless Rule protection in those states, those protections are lost at a minimum for at least the several years it has and will take to get petitions accepted and complete rulemaking. Magistrate Judge Laporte's opinions imply that when an agency is reversing a rulemaking, federal courts require a "reasoned analysis" under NEPA that: 1) explains why there is a need to change policy and why that change is necessary;
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2) fully explains why the past administrations' analysis or assumptions were erroneous or misguided; and 3) addresses the concerns of comment agencies who point out concerns with the new rule.
Reasons for the Bush Administration's Failure to Reverse Rules
Several barriers, both institutional and legal, exist to agency attempts to reverse policy. The institutional barriers to rulemaking reversals exist because an agency's analysis of an issue comes from the civil servants at the ground level, but the policy comes from the political appointees at the top of the agency. 224) The political appointees know what they want the outcome of an analysis to be, but they cannot tell the civil servants who collect the data how to analyze the data in such a way to achieve that result. Based on the cases discussed, State Farm's "reasoned analysis" appears contextual the more analysis and data in the record in the first rulemaking, the harder it is for the agency to reverse course both institutionally (because the agency employees studying the issue have to come to opposite conclusions often with the same data) and legally (because federal courts 정책 제13권(2014.9.30) will take a "hard look" at the agency's prior NEPA analysis |230| 환경법과 정책 제13권(2014.9.30) argument that it had discretion to change policy to carry out the goals of the Northwest Forest Plan because the government did not explain why the "survey and manage" standards were no longer necessary in light of the government's prior NEPA analysis which acknowledged that the standards were necessary to address the degraded condition of the forest. 236) The cases discussed also speak to the thorough analysis of the Clinton Administration's NEPA and ESA consultations, some of which came from "midnight regulations." 237) The term "midnight regulations" is clearly a misnomer when applied to all rulemakings that come at the end of a president's term. While eleventh-hour actions such as the last minute delivery of judicial appointments 238) fit this term, rulemakings such as the Clinton Snowcoach Rule 239) or the Roadless Rule, 240) while published in the waning days of the administration, were the product of years of analysis and proceedings. 241) As a result, the term "midnight regulations" should be reserved for those instances where a president is acting at the last minute and should not be applied to rulemakings which were the product of years of analysis. 242) Snowcoach Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,260 (Jan. 22, 2001) . 240) Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,244 (Jan. 12, 2001) . 241) The Clinton Administration published the Snowcoach Rule on January 22, 2001, but had been considering a ban on snowmobiles since 1997. The Clinton Administration published the Roadless Rule on January 12, 2001, but had begun analyzing the impacts of roads on roadless areas in early 1999. 242) Loring, supra note 22, at 1448. The term "midnight regulation" assumes "that regulations promulgated in the midnight period are rushed through the system during the interim period. Significant regulations, however, cannot be proposed and completed in the period between election day and inauguration day, as it can take years for a significant regulation to clear OMB review." Id.
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discussed State Farm in a 5-4 opinion reversing the Second Circuit and upholding the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) ban on fleeting expletives. 244) The Second Circuit struck down the FCC's new policy, relying in part on its own precedent which required a "more substantial explanation" for an agency reversing policy under State Farm. 245) Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 246) reiterated that State Farm did not require an agency reversing a rulemaking to justify the change "by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy in the first instance." 247) Justice Scalia also noted that the APA makes no distinction between an initial agency action and an agency reversing that action. 248) He stated that although the agency must show that there are good reasons for the new policy, the agency does not need to demonstrate that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old policy. 249) However, Justice Scalia conceded that if the "new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy," a "reasoned explanation" is necessary to disregard those facts and circumstances that were the basis of the prior policy. 250) Therefore, it appears that an agency's reversal is not what triggers a more "reasoned analysis," but rather the agency's statements and analysis in the first rulemaking. the same standard of review applied to different circumstances. 258) Therefore, in a rulemaking reversal, the agency must focus on why the reasons for adopting the initial policy are no longer good and explain how the agency came to a different conclusion. 259) Although Fox Televisions Stations and the cases discussed in this article are in different contexts, all involve challenges to an agency's reversal of policy. A careful review of Justice Kennedy's concurrence indicates that he could provide the hypothetical fifth vote in an environmental or natural resources rulemaking reversal because of his statements indicating the importance of the prior data before the agency. 260) The cases discussed here seem to suggest that NEPA's "hard look"
gives teeth to State Farm's "reasoned analysis" because a prior NEPA analysis results in data and conclusions which the next administration must refute to survive "arbitrary and capricious" review. The data from prior NEPA analysis in the Clinton rules distinguish the grazing, survey and manage, snowmobile, and the The most recent change in administrations is particularly interesting because of the policies of the Bush Administration and the inter-political party change at the White House, with indications that the Obama Administration will promote a more environmentally-friendly agenda. 263) However, the Obama Administration would do well to learn the lessons that plagued its predecessors in the White House.
The Bush Administration's focus often appeared to be concentrated solely on repealing the Clinton Administration's rules, with little regard to the future of its own regulations. In many cases, both discussed here and elsewhere, 264) 
